

# Probability Prediction in Children with ASD

Zi L. Sim (zi@berkeley.edu)

Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley  
Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

Fei Xu (fei\_xu@berkeley.edu)

Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley  
Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

## Abstract

Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) often struggle with making inductive generalizations. Yet for typically developing children, the capacity to make such generalizations is a hallmark of human learning. This ability requires some understanding of “intuitive statistics” (i.e., the understanding that there is a relationship between samples and populations), which have been previously demonstrated to emerge early on in infancy. We hypothesized that the challenges with inductive generalization among the ASD population may have its roots in weaknesses in probabilistic reasoning. In the current study, we gave children with ASD a probability prediction task adapted from the method used with infants in Teglas et al. (2007), and our results over two experiments with two groups (one from the U.S. and one from Singapore) suggest that compared with typically developing children, children with autism may have difficulties in engaging in probabilistic reasoning.

**Keywords:** autism; probabilistic reasoning; prediction

## Introduction

Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder that is characterized by impairments in social interaction and communication, as well as the presence of restricted patterns of behaviors and interests (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Baron-Cohen, 1997). Cognitive research in the field of autism has centered on three traditions when it comes to accounting for ASD (Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007): the theory-of-mind (ToM) hypothesis, which posits that symptoms of autism manifest because of deficits in the ability to impute mental states to oneself and to others (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Premack & Woodruff, 1978); the executive dysfunction hypothesis, which argues that the symptoms of autism are caused by core difficulties in the planning and execution of complex actions (Hill, 2004; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991); and the weak central coherence theory, which proposes that individuals with autism favor local processing (i.e., the details) over global processing (i.e., “the big picture”) (Happé & Frith, 2006).

A relatively unexplored perspective is that which conceptualizes autism as a disorder of learning (following Pellicano, 2010; Solomon, Smith, Frank, Ly, & Carter, 2011). For instance, a common finding from intervention studies is that individuals with autism often fail to generalize explicitly taught skills across different contexts or to related skills (e.g., Dawson, Mottron, & Gernsbacher,

2005; Hwang & Hughes, 2000; Ivar Lovaas & Smith, 1989; Ozonoff & Miller, 1995). In more recent work, researchers have found that children and adolescents with ASD were less likely to learn from their experiences, and that their generalizations were less consistent when compared to typically developing participants (de Marchena, Eigsti, & Yerys, 2015). Clinicians have also long reported that children with autism often struggle with generalization (Rimland, 1964): for example, after being taught to brush their teeth with a green toothbrush, children with autism may appear to be at a loss when asked to brush their teeth with a red toothbrush later on.

Yet for typically developing children, the capacity to make such generalizations is a hallmark of human learning. Given small amounts of data, human learners readily make inductive inferences, formulating general principles that are extracted from the specific data. Developmental research have repeatedly demonstrated that children are extremely proficient learners, making inductive generalizations with much ease. They learn the meanings of some words with just a single labeled exemplar (Carey & Bartlett, 1978); they generalize non-obvious properties to novel objects after just a short demonstration (Baldwin, Markman, & Melartin, 1993; Gelman & Davidson, 2013; Welder & Graham, 2006), and they learn the physical rules of occlusion with just a single trial (Wang & Baillargeon, 2005).

To make such generalizations proficiently requires some understanding of “intuitive statistics”, that is, understanding that a random sample enables one to make predictions about an overall population, and conversely, that a population allows one to make predictions about randomly drawn samples. This type of statistical inference can be found in almost every domain of learning, e.g., physical reasoning, social cognition, word learning, and causal reasoning (Chomsky, 1980; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Gopnik & Sobel, 2000; Gopnik & Wellman, 2012; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009; Keil, 1981; Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, 2010; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007), and the ability to make such inferences allows learners to rapidly acquire new knowledge about the world.

Previous research have demonstrated that intuitive statistics emerges very early on in development, enabling children to engage in inductive learning within the first few years of life: 6- to 12-month-old infants are sensitive to differences in probabilities (Denison, Reed, & Xu, 2011;

Téglás, Giroto, Gonzalez, & Bonatti, 2007; Xu & Garcia, 2008) For example, Téglás et al. (2007) showed that in a lottery machine-like setup that consisted of 1 yellow and 3 blue objects bouncing around, infants were more “surprised” to see a yellow object (low probability) exiting the machine, than when a blue object (high probability) did. Furthermore, this early sensitivity has been shown to guide infants and young children in making predictions and in fulfilling their goals and desires (Acredolo, O’Connor, Banks, & Horobin, 1989; Denison & Xu, 2010, 2014; Yost, Siegel, & Andrews, 1962; Zhu & Gigerenzer, 2006).

As such, we hypothesize that the challenges that autistic individuals face with generalization may have their roots in weaknesses in probabilistic reasoning. There is some preliminary evidence for this claim: in a large-scale foraging task where ASD children (8- to 12-year-olds) and matched controls had to search a room for a target among possible search locations embedded into the floor, researchers found that the autistic individuals appeared to be less sensitive to the statistical properties of the search area, taking a much longer time as compared to the matched controls to realize that one side of the room was more likely to contain the target (Pellicano et al., 2011).

In the current study, we directly examined probabilistic reasoning in children with ASD by adapting the method used with infants in Téglás et al. (2007). This method was suitable due to its relatively low task demands and was specifically about probabilistic reasoning. Over two experiments, 6- to 12-year-old children with ASD and matched controls were presented with movies displaying four objects bouncing around a lottery-like machine. The movies were identical to those shown to 12-month-old infants in Téglás et al. (2007). The two groups of children were subsequently asked to predict which object would fall out by choosing between two pictures displaying two possible outcomes.

## Experiment 1

### Method

**Participants** The sample consisted of 21 verbally fluent English-speaking 6- to 12-year-old children (18 boys) with ASD. Diagnoses were confirmed through a review of clinical diagnostic reports provided by the parents. The mean age of the sample was 104.6 months (range = 80.6 to 150.6 months). All participants were recruited from Pathlight School, which is an autism-focused school in Singapore that offers mainstream academic curriculum and life-readiness skills. Average Performance IQ was 101.3 ( $SD = 17.3$ ). Two children were tested but excluded for failing the control task.

**Materials** Seven QuickTime movies simulating four three-dimensional, solid objects bouncing inside a lottery-like machine were presented on a 17-inch screen using the PsyScope software running on a MacBook Pro. These movies were provided by Luca Bonatti from the set of

stimuli presented to 12-month-old infants in Téglás et al. (2007). For each movie, two picture cards (8.5 inches x 6 inches) displaying two different possible outcomes were printed in color and laminated. The back of these picture cards had a small Velcro strip with “loops.” A separate A4-sized (8.27 inches x 11.69 inches) laminated card was also used, displaying the words “What happened?” above a large empty printed rectangle. At the center of the rectangle was a Velcro strip with “hooks,” so a picture card could be attached to this large laminated card.

**Procedure** Children were tested individually in a quiet room at Pathlight School. They sat about 30 inches from the screen. The children’s parents were present in the room, but were seated about 60 inches behind the child’s chair. Parents filled out questionnaires throughout the session to reduce the potential for influencing their children’s answers.

The procedure consisted of two phases: familiarization and test. Children were shown two familiarization movies, four experimental movies and one control movie. The order of presentation for the four experimental movies was counterbalanced across subjects. Before each movie, a visual attractor always appeared on the screen (with sounds) to orient the child’s attention to the center of the screen.

**Familiarization Phase** In this phase, children watched two familiarization movies in which two types of objects (two of each type, e.g. two blue cubes and two yellow crosses) bounced around the lottery-like container. After approximately 10 seconds, one of the objects (e.g. a blue cube) fell out of the container accompanied by a “cuckoo” sound. 1 second later, the remaining objects in the container were occluded. This procedure was repeated for the next familiarization movie, except that the other type of object (e.g. a yellow cross) fell out of the container this time.

**Test Phase** In the test phase, children participated in four experimental trials and one control trial. In each experimental trial (Figure 1), three identical objects and one object of a different color and shape (e.g. three blue cubes and one yellow cross) were shown bouncing around the container. After approximately 10 seconds, the container was occluded as in the Familiarization Phase. 2 seconds later, a “cuckoo” sound was made, but the bottom half of the screen was blocked such that it was not possible to see which object had fallen out. The experimenter said, “Something happened, but the screen got blocked!” She then presented two pictures displaying the two possible outcomes (e.g., one of the three identical objects had exited the container vs. the object different in color and shape had exited the container) and said, “Now, I have these two pictures over here.” Next, the “What happened?” card was presented and the experimenter asked, “Can you show me what happened?” The children were requested to attach one of the picture cards to the large rectangular box. If children failed to respond, the experimenter pointed to the card on the right and said, “If you think this happened, put this card

here,” and pointed to the card on the left and said, “If you think this happened, put this card here” in a neutral tone of voice. After children made a clear choice by placing one of the picture cards on to the “What happened?” card, the experimenter proceeded to the next experimental trial. The order of presentation for the four experimental movies was counterbalanced across all participants.




Figure 1: (A) Screenshot from an experimental movie. (B) & (C) Two pictures displaying two possible outcomes.

After the four experimental trials were completed, children were presented with a control trial (Figure 2). Like the experimental movies, the control movie presented three identical objects and one object different in color and shape bouncing around the container. However, there was now a physical barrier in the middle of the container that confined the three identical objects to the top of the container. As such, it was physically impossible for any of the three identical objects to exit the container. The procedure that followed was exactly the same as that of the experimental trials, and children were asked to choose between two picture cards displaying two different outcomes (e.g. one of the three identical objects had crossed the barrier and exited the container vs. the object different in color and shape had exited the container) as a representation of what had happened.

No feedback was given during any of the test trials. The experimenter only responded “Okay” to all of the children’s choices.

**Coding** Children’s responses in the test trials (four experimental and one control) were scored for accuracy. As children were asked to predict what had happened, choosing the probable outcome was scored as 1 point. Choosing the improbable/impossible outcome was thus scored as 0 points. A second coder recoded all of the children’s responses, and the level of agreement between the coders was 100%.

## Results

An alpha level of 0.05 was used in all statistical analyses. Preliminary analyses found no effects of median age-split (whether the children were younger or older than the median age of the group) and the order of presentation for the four experimental movies. Subsequent analyses were collapsed over these variables.

Overall, we found that the children in the Singapore ASD sample were able to respond correctly in the control trial. 19 out of 21 children responded correctly, and this proportion was significantly different from chance, Exact binomial  $p$  (two-tailed)  $< .001$ . However, children in the final ASD sample consisting of the 19 children who passed the control trial did not perform significantly differently from chance (.50) on the experimental trials ( $M = .47, SD = .38, t(18) = -.301, p = .77$ ). A conservative binomial test based on the total number of correct trials also showed that children did not perform significantly different from chance, Exact binomial  $p$  (two-tailed) = .77.




Figure 2: (A) Screenshot from the control movie. (B) & (C) Two pictures displaying two possible outcomes.

## Discussion

The children in the ASD sample in Singapore did not perform reliably better than chance levels in our probability prediction task. This result is striking given that the movies used were adapted from Téglás et al. (2007), in which researchers found strong evidence that 12-month-old typically developing infants have rational expectations about future events based on single-event likelihoods. Furthermore, the low rate of success did not appear to be due to a lack of understanding with regards to the task requirements, since 19 out of 21 of the ASD children (90.5%) answered the control trial correctly. However, it remains a possibility that typically developing children

would likewise fail at such a probability prediction task. In other words, while 12-month-old infants may look longer when presented with an improbable event as compared to a probable event, older children may still find it difficult to explicitly make predictions about future events based on their likelihoods. Such an account is conceivable, as the infant procedure used in Téglás et al. (2007) was an implicit, non-verbal task, while our adapted procedure is arguably a task that is more explicit and verbal in nature. In Experiment 2, we thus collected data from a US sample consisting of both ASD and typically developing children.

## Experiment 2

### Method

**Participants** The sample consisted of nine verbally fluent English-speaking 6- to 12-year-old children (8 boys) with ASD and nine typically developing (TD) 6- to 12-year-old children (4 boys), group-matched by chronological age. All participants were recruited from Berkeley, California, and its surrounding communities through advertisements. Diagnoses of the ASD participants were confirmed through a review of clinical diagnostic reports provided by the parents. Participants in the TD group were excluded if they had first-degree relatives with an ASD diagnosis. Age was not found to be significantly different between the two groups ( $M_{ASD} = 97.07$ ,  $SD_{ASD} = 18.77$ ;  $M_{TD} = 98.44$ ,  $SD_{TD} = 19.93$ ),  $t(16) = .15$ ,  $p = .88$ . Visual Spatial Index scores, which measure the ability to integrate and synthesize part-whole relationships, to evaluate visual details, and to understand visual-spatial relationships, did not differ significantly between groups ( $M_{ASD} = 103.29$ ,  $SD_{ASD} = 11.45$ ;  $M_{TD} = 111.33$ ,  $SD_{TD} = 15.51$ ) as well,  $t(14) = 1.15$ ,  $p = .27$ . This index score was not obtained for two of the children in the ASD sample due to a lack of response to the component subtests.

**Materials and Procedure** The materials and procedure in Experiment 2 were similar to those of Experiment 1, except for the Familiarization Phase. The Familiarization Phase was modified slightly to increase children's understanding of the task, and the procedure is as follows:

**Familiarization Phase** In this phase, children watched each of the two familiarization movies twice. During the first familiarization movie, the experimenter commented on the occurring events in such a manner, "Objects bounce around this circle. When you hear this noise [cuckoo noise], one object falls out." The second familiarization movie was then played, and the experimenter commented on the events in the same way. Each of the two familiarization movies was then played once more, without any additional instructions.

**Test Phase** The test phase in Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1.

**Coding** Children's responses in the test trials (four experimental and one control) were scored in the same way as Experiment 1. A second coder recoded all of the children's responses, and the level of agreement between the coders was 100%.

### Results

An alpha level of 0.05 was used in all statistical analyses. Preliminary analyses found no effects of median age-split (whether the children were younger or older than the median age of the group) and the order of presentation for the four experimental movies. Subsequent analyses were collapsed over these variables.

Overall, we found that children in both the ASD and TD sample were able to respond correctly in the control trial – all of the children tested made the correct prediction, and this proportion was significantly different from chance, Exact binomial  $p$  (two-tailed)  $< .001$ . Using children's responses over the four test trials, we then performed a repeated measures logistic regression with group (ASD vs. TD) as the between-subjects variable. Our results indicate that there was a significant difference between the performance of the ASD and TD children ( $M_{ASD} = .36$ ,  $SD_{ASD} = .28$ ;  $M_{TD} = .70$ ,  $SD_{TD} = .21$ ), Wald Chi-Square = 7.96,  $p = .005$ . A conservative binomial test based on the total number of correct trials also showed that TD children performed significantly better than chance, Exact binomial  $p$  (two-tailed) = .029, while ASD children did not, Exact binomial  $p$  (two-tailed) = .13.

### Discussion

In Experiment 2, we found a significant difference between the performance of the ASD and TD children: Children in the ASD sample in Berkeley did not perform reliably better than chance levels in our probability prediction task, which replicates our findings in Experiment 1. In contrast, typically developing children were successful at this task and were able to make predictions about future events based on their likelihoods. This difference found between the two groups did not appear to be due to a difference in the children's ability to understand the task requirements, as all of the participants were able to respond to the control trial correctly.

### General Discussion

The present study examined whether children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) show weaknesses in probabilistic reasoning. Using a probability prediction task adapted from a method used with 12-month-old infants (Téglás et al., 2007), we found across two different samples that high-functioning, verbally fluent children with ASD struggled with making predictions about future events based on their single-event likelihoods. In contrast, our comparison group of typically developing children were successful in making such predictions, consistent with results obtained from previous studies with infants and young children (Acredolo

et al., 1989; Denison & Xu, 2010, 2014; Yost et al., 1962; Zhu & Gigerenzer, 2006). The current findings are striking, considering that the two groups of children in Experiment 2 did not differ in their Visual Spatial Index scores, which are particularly relevant for processing the stimuli presented in our task.

May our results be better accounted for by the three dominant cognitive theories for ASD? While more research would be necessary to carefully tease these accounts apart, we have reason to believe that the current cognitive theories do not necessarily do so. According to the theory-of-mind hypothesis, the core deficit of autism is a failure/delay in taking into account others' mental states. Given that our task does not ostensibly require participants to impute the mental state of others, it is unlikely that the difference found in probabilistic reasoning between the ASD and TD groups would be related to any previously established differences in ToM. With regards to the executive dysfunction hypothesis, the high rate at which the ASD children were passing the control task suggests that they had an ability to sustain attention to the presented movies in the current study. It is possible that this group of children appeared to respond correctly on the control trial due to difficulties in inhibiting the prepotent response of selecting the dissimilar object exiting as the predicted outcome (i.e., choosing the picture with one blue object outside of the container, rather than the picture with one of the three identical yellow objects outside of the container). However, if this alternative explanation were to be true, then the ASD children should have performed significantly worse than chance on the experimental trials because of an equivalent tendency to select the low-probability outcomes. Finally, the weak central coherence theory posits that autism is characterized by a weak drive towards obtaining global coherence, such that individuals with autism are predisposed to process information in a detail-focused, piecemeal way. Again, it is unclear how such a theory would account for the different success rate that children with ASD show on the experimental trials vs. the control trials; how would attending to the details of the movies in a segmented manner lead children to pass the control but not the experimental trials?

Therefore, our results suggest that there may be early differences in probabilistic reasoning between children with autism and typically developing children. This weakness in intuitive statistics may result in impairments when making inductive generalizations. That being said, it should be noted that autism is an extremely complex phenomenon. We do not think that the demonstrated weakness in probabilistic reasoning is necessarily a defining factor for autism, or a factor that would explain the full spectrum of autism symptomatology. Instead, we speculate that this deficit may be general to all learners who have difficulties with making inductive generalizations. Given the centrality of inductive learning in almost every domain, such early difficulties may lead to a cascade of negative consequences in development, and this would be the case whether with regards to children

with autism or children with other developmental disorders. Work is ongoing in our lab to examine more closely the deficit in probability prediction using other related tasks, and whether the deficits in probabilistic reasoning may be directly linked to deficits in the ability to make inductive generalizations.

Finally, we note that the current work examines autism through the lens of learning, which may allow its findings to be more amendable to the design of interventions, an aspect that is especially important to stakeholders of the ASD community. As such, we believe that the current work is a first step towards opening up new grounds in the study of autism.

## Acknowledgments

We thank Pathlight School in Singapore, as well as Ariana Grande, Ashley Heywood, Sulynn Miao, Erica Shade, Grace Shen, and Sarah Stewart for their help in testing, and all the parents and children for their participation. This work was partially supported by SFARI grant 347393 from the Simons Foundation.

## References

- Begus, K., Gliga, T., & Southgate, V. (2014). Infants learn what they want to learn: responding to infant pointing leads to superior learning. *PLoS one*, 9(10), e108817.
- Acredolo, C., O'Connor, J., Banks, L., & Horobin, K. (1989). Children's ability to make probability estimates: Skills revealed through application of Anderson's functional measurement methodology. *Child Development*, 60(4), 933–945.
- Baldwin, D. A., Markman, E. M., & Melartin, R. L. (1993). Infants' ability to draw inferences about nonobvious object properties: Evidence from exploratory play. *Child Development*, 64(3), 711–728.
- Baron-Cohen, S. (1997). *Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind*. MIT Press.
- Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a "theory of mind"? *Cognition*, 21(1), 37–46.
- Carey, S., & Bartlett, E. (1978). Acquiring a Single New Word. In *Proceedings of the Stanford Child Language Conference* (Vol. 15, pp. 17–29).
- Chomsky, N. (1980). Rules and representations. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 3(01), 1–15.
- Dawson, M., Mottron, L., & Gernsbacher, M. A. (2005). Learning in Autism.
- de Marchena, A. B., Eigsti, I.-M., & Yerys, B. E. (2015). Brief Report: Generalization Weaknesses in Verbally Fluent Children and Adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorder. *Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders*, 45(10), 3370–3376. <http://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-015-2478-6>
- Denison, S., Reed, C., & Xu, F. (2011). The emergence of probabilistic reasoning in very young infants. ... *the 33rd Annual Meeting of the ...*
- Denison, S., & Xu, F. (2010). Twelve- to 14-month-old infants can predict single-event probability with large set sizes.

- Developmental Science*, 13(5), 798–803.  
<http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00943.x>
- Denison, S., & Xu, F. (2014). The origins of probabilistic inference in human infants. *Cognition*, 130(3), 335–47.  
<http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.001>
- Gelman, S. A., & Davidson, N. S. (2013). Conceptual influences on category-based induction. *Cognitive Psychology*, 66(3), 327–353.  
<http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2013.02.001>
- Gelman, S. A., & Wellman, H. M. (1991). Insides and essences: Early understandings non-obvious\*. *Cognition*, 38, 213–244.
- Gopnik, A., & Sobel, D. M. (2000). Detectingblickets: how young children use information about novel causal powers in categorization and induction. *Child Development*, 71(5), 1205–22.
- Gopnik, A., & Wellman, H. M. (2012). Reconstructing constructivism: causal models, Bayesian learning mechanisms, and the theory theory. *Psychological Bulletin*, 138(6), 1085–108.  
<http://doi.org/10.1037/a0028044>
- Griffiths, T. L., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2009). Theory-based causal induction. *Psychological Review*, 116(4), 661–716. <http://doi.org/10.1037/a0017201>
- Happé, F., & Frith, U. (2006). The weak coherence account: detail-focused cognitive style in autism spectrum disorders. *Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders*, 36(1), 5–25. <http://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-005-0039-0>
- Hill, E. L. (2004). Executive dysfunction in autism. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 8(1), 26–32.  
<http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2003.11.003>
- Hwang, B., & Hughes, C. (2000). The effects of social interactive training on early social communicative skills of children with autism. *Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders*, 30(4).
- Ivar Lovaas, O., & Smith, T. (1989). A comprehensive behavioral theory of autistic children: Paradigm for research and treatment. *Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry*, 20(1), 17–29.  
[http://doi.org/10.1016/0005-7916\(89\)90004-9](http://doi.org/10.1016/0005-7916(89)90004-9)
- Keil, F. C. (1981). Constraints on knowledge and cognitive development. *Psychological Review*, (May).
- Kushnir, T., Xu, F., & Wellman, H. M. (2010). Young children use statistical sampling to infer the preferences of other people. *Psychological Science*, 21(8), 1134–40.  
<http://doi.org/10.1177/0956797610376652>
- Nisbett, R. E., Krantz, D. H., Jepson, C., & Kunda, Z. (1983). The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning. *Psychological Review*, 90(4), 339–363.  
<http://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295X.90.4.339>
- Ozonoff, S., & Miller, J. N. (1995). Teaching theory of mind: a new approach to social skills training for individuals with autism. *Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders*, 25(4), 415–33.
- Ozonoff, S., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. J. (1991). Executive function deficits in high-functioning autistic individuals: relationship to theory of mind. *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, and Allied Disciplines*, 32(7), 1081–105.
- Pellicano, E. (2010). The development of core cognitive skills in autism: a 3-year prospective study. *Child Development*, 81(5), 1400–16.  
<http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2010.01481.x>
- Pellicano, E., Smith, A. D., Cristino, F., Hood, B. M., Briscoe, J., & Gilchrist, I. D. (2011). Children with autism are neither systematic nor optimal foragers. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 108(1), 421–6.  
<http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1014076108>
- Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, (4), 515–526.
- Rajendran, G., & Mitchell, P. (2007). Cognitive theories of autism. *Developmental Review*, 27(2), 224–260.  
<http://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2007.02.001>
- Rimland, B. (1964). Infantile autism: The syndrome and its implications for a neural theory of behavior.
- Solomon, M., Smith, A. C., Frank, M. J., Ly, S., & Carter, C. S. (2011). Probabilistic reinforcement learning in adults with autism spectrum disorders. *Autism Research: Official Journal of the International Society for Autism Research*, 4(2), 109–20. <http://doi.org/10.1002/aur.177>
- Téglás, E., Girotto, V., Gonzalez, M., & Bonatti, L. L. (2007). Intuitions of probabilities shape expectations about the future at 12 months and beyond. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 104(48), 19156–9.  
<http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0700271104>
- Wang, S., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Inducing infants to detect a physical violation in a single trial. *Psychological Science*, 16(7), 542–9. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01572.x>
- Welder, A. N., & Graham, S. a. (2006). Infants' categorization of novel objects with more or less obvious features. *Cognitive Psychology*, 52(1), 57–91.  
<http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2005.05.003>
- Xu, F., & Garcia, V. (2008). Intuitive statistics by 8-month-old infants. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 105(13), 5012–5. <http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0704450105>
- Xu, F., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2007). Word learning as Bayesian inference. *Psychological Review*, 114(2), 245–72.  
<http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.114.2.245>
- Yost, P., Siegel, A., & Andrews, J. (1962). Nonverbal probability judgments by young children. *Child Development*, 33(4), 769–780.
- Zhu, L., & Gigerenzer, G. (2006). Children can solve Bayesian problems: the role of representation in mental computation. *Cognition*, 98(3), 287–308.  
<http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2004.12.003>